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Virtual Water, Water Scarcity, and
International Trade Law
Edith Brown Weiss*,† and Lydia Slobodian**
I . INTRODUCTION
We are facing a fresh water crisis during this century. In less than two decades,
by 2030, the requirements for fresh water are expected to exceed the currently
available and accessible fresh water supplies by 40%.1 Many countries are expected
to be water stressed later in this century; some areas of the world already are. Some
people may even lack water to meet basic human needs, such as drinking, washing,
and sanitation. In rural areas in certain regions, people may lack water to grow
good food crops, even for their own consumption. This has major implications for
the welfare of the world’s population and for the integrity and violability of
ecosystems.
At a minimum, we are facing a series of local or regionalized fresh water crises,
which will have global political, economic, and social repercussions. More likely,
these localized and regional water crises will also lead to a global fresh water crisis in
the sense that sufficient water will not be available for the purposes needed and at
the time needed. Fossil ground water aquifers will be increasingly depleted, and tech-
nology may not be sufficient to ensure secure water supplies. While the details of the
pending fresh water crisis have been set forth elsewhere, the implications for the
trade in virtual water and the application of international trade law need to be further
addressed.2 This article focuses on this connection.
Fresh water is essential to our lives and to our planet. There is no known substi-
tute. Only about 2.5% of Earth’s water is fresh water, and of this, only 0.4% is surface
water, and about 30% is ground water.3 Most of the rest is in glaciers and icecaps,
* Francis Cabell Brown Professor, International Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Email:
weiss@law.georgetown.edu
** Legal Officer, International Union for Conservation of Nature Environmental Law Centre. Email:
lydia.slobodian@iucn.org
† This article is dedicated to my valued colleague and friend, John H. Jackson, with great appreciation for
our stimulating collaboration on environment and trade issues.
1 2030 Water Resources Group, Charting Our Water Future, 5 (2009). New York: McKinsey Co.,
International Finance Corporation.
2 See Edith Brown Weiss, International Law for a Water-Scarce World (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2013),
briefly treating virtual water and international trade law.
3 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Global Environment Outlook 4 (Nairobi: UNEP, 2007) 118.
VC The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
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which are mostly inaccessible. About 70% of water used today is for agriculture, and
more than 90% of water consumed is for agriculture.4 This means that agriculture
provides the global framework within which the trade in virtual water and interna-
tional trade law must be considered. Water quality is also important, since pollution
reduces the amount of water available for human use. Agriculture is one of the major
polluters of both ground and surface water. At the same time, water for agriculture
may suffer from pollution caused by other sources.
The central economic feature of fresh water is that generally it does not have a
price attached to it. The only costs are for extraction and delivery of supplies, and
these may be subsidized. Thus, while we face a crisis in the availability of fresh water,
with agriculture as the biggest user, there are few, if any, economic incentives to con-
serve water or to use it efficiently.
Understandably, there is great concern about the commodification of water.
Resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and the Human
Rights Council in 2010 posit a human right to water and to sanitation.5 While there
is no formal consensus specifying the contents of such a right to water, it is generally
considered to cover the amount of water necessary for drinking and bathing, and for
sanitation. Many would argue that it also covers the amount of water necessary for
subsistence agriculture to feed oneself and family in rural areas, and in this sense
links with a right to food. Because of concerns about sufficient water to meet basic
needs and for various cultural reasons, many people have been reluctant to accept
any commodification of fresh water. But the result is that large agribusiness, in partic-
ular, gains from a free resource, while poor people often suffer.
There is not only a crisis in the availability of fresh water supplies but also in their
geographic distribution. Supplies are unequally distributed in the world. Regions
with arid climates and with limited water resources are estimated to cover large parts
of Africa (northern and southern Africa), 60% of Asia, 33% of Europe, 30% of Latin
America, the southwestern part of North America, and most of Australia.6 Most of
the Middle East is arid with limited water resources. Within countries, the areas that
are water rich may not match those in which there is the greatest demand for water.
Thus, as we address issues of virtual water and international trade, we have to con-
sider both the physical supply and the equity issues.
The proposed post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals recognize the impor-
tance of managing agricultural trade to promoting food security and sustainable
development, including through eliminating agricultural subsidies (goal 2.b). The
Goals also include objectives to increase substantially water use efficiency across all
4 United States Intelligence Community, Intelligence Community Assessment: Global Water Security
(Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence Council, 2012) ii (referencing World Bank data).
5 The human right to water and sanitation, United Nations General Assembly resolution 64/292, A/RES/
64/292, adopted 28 July 2010; Human Rights and access to safe drinking water and sanitation, United
Nations Human Rights Council resolution 15/9, A/HRC/RES/15/9, adopted 30 September 2010.
6 Igor A. Shiklomanov, ‘World Fresh Water Resources’, in Peter Gleick (ed), Water in Crisis (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1993) 16. See also H.L. Saeijs and M.J. Van Berkel, ‘Global Water Crisis: The
Major Issue of the 21st Century’, 5 European Water Pollution Control 26 (1995). Shiklomanov provides
various tables on water distribution among countries and river basins. Later studies point to a worsening
water crisis.
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sectors by 2030, while at the same time achieving universal access to safe and afford-
able drinking water and adequate sanitation (goals 6.1 and 6.4).7
Conceptually, the problem is how to get fresh water from where it is in excess to
where it is needed and to encourage efficient water use. Normally, fresh water flows
naturally across national borders in rivers or streams, or in some cases slowly in
transboundary aquifers. Two major international conventions cover these natural
transboundary water flows: the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses, which entered into force in August 2014, and
the UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses
and International Lakes, which opened for accession by non-UNECE countries in
February 2013. Both Conventions promote the principle of equitable and reasonable
use of transboundary watercourses, and establish substantive and procedural obliga-
tions to guide countries in sustainably managing and sharing water resources. These
instruments are critical to improving sustainable water use in shared basins and
aquifers.
The question remains, though, of how to manage water transfers between regions
or between countries that do not share a water resource, in order to reduce pressure
on water scarce regions, and to increase efficiency of water use. With other goods
such as oil, coal or natural gas, we can physically transport the resource. Fresh water
is different. For the most part, we do not engage in artificial bulk transport of physi-
cal water across national boundaries, because of the difficult of doing so, the water
loss rate, and the cost.
One approach to understanding and managing water transfers between regions is
to view fresh water in terms of ‘virtual water’. The concept was first articulated in the
early to mid-1990s.8 Under this concept, the focus is not on the physical transfer of
water but rather on the amount of water used to produce a given product.9 Not sur-
prisingly, most of the trade in virtual water involves the agricultural sector, since agri-
culture accounts for more than 70% of fresh water use, and more than 90% of fresh
water consumption. Countries with limited fresh water supplies can limit the burden
on them by becoming net importers of goods that are water-intensive, while those
countries with plentiful water resources can profit by becoming net exporters of
water-intensive goods. Producers of water intensive products can relocate to areas
where climate and other conditions are more conducive to efficient use of water.
Water consumption will thus be reduced on the global scale. While reality is more
complicated, the concept of international trade in virtual water reflects this premise.
International trade rules apply to this trade in virtual water. The rules and poten-
tial changes in the rules applicable to the agricultural sector may have unforeseen
7 Proposed Sustainable Development Goals, 19 July 2014, available at http://sustainabledevelopment.un.
org/focussdgs.html.
8 John Anthony Allan, ‘Fortunately There are Substitutes for Water: Otherwise Our Hydropolitical Futures
Would be Impossible’, in Priorities for Water Resources Allocation and Management (London: Overseas
Development Administration, 1992) 13–26; John Anthony Allan, ‘Virtual Water: A Strategic Resource,
Global Solutions to Regional Deficits’, 36 Groundwater 545–546 (1998).
9 Arjen Y. Hoekstra and Ashok K. Chapagain, Globalization of Water: Sharing the Planet’s Freshwater
Resources (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008) 8–10. The authors argue that ‘use’ can be quantified, as dis-
tinguished from the term ‘water needed’ to produce a product, which is subject to interpretation.
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implications for the trade in virtual water and most importantly for the fresh water
crisis. Unless water has a price, trade liberalization in the agricultural sector may inad-
vertently intensify the fresh water-scarcity crisis. On the other hand, measures
designed to encourage water efficiency and to give consumers information about
water sources and water intensity will need to comply with international trade rules.
This article explores these issues and is intended to provide a preliminary analysis
to generate further discussion and potentially lead to policy deliberations.
A. Trade in virtual water
Virtual water describes water that is used to produce a product, but is not necessarily
contained in the final product. The term ‘water footprint’ describes all the virtual
water contained in or used by a certain product, country, or individual. When a prod-
uct is traded internationally, the virtual water it contains is transferred to the import-
ing country, increasing that country’s water footprint. At the turn of the 21st
century, an estimated 1625 billion cubic meters per year of virtual water flowed in
international trade.10
Most virtual water is used in agricultural products and their derivatives. However,
some of these agricultural products are then used as inputs into other products, such
as clothing or processed food, so that ultimately agricultural products make up only
an estimated 35% of the consumer-level water footprint; processed food makes up
22%; industrial products make up 23%; and services, including residential water util-
ities, make up 21%.11
Estimates differ as to what percentage of virtual water enters international trade.
Allan, for example, estimates 15% of virtual water contained in agricultural crops and
livestock enters international trade.12 Zhan-Ming and Chen estimate that one-third
of global water withdrawal is used for products (or inputs into other products) that
ultimately enter international trade.13 The estimates reflect differences in how virtual
trade is modeled and in what is measured. But in all cases, the estimates indicate that
virtual water is significant in international trade. Notably, the trade in virtual water is
the greatest among a handful of mostly developed countries.14
B. Virtual water and water scarcity
Increasing trade in virtual water is often championed as a way to improve
efficiency in the use of water globally and to distribute resources from water-rich to
water-poor countries and thereby alleviate food insecurity that could result from
10 Ibid.
11 Chen Zhan-Ming and Guoquian Chen, ‘Virtual Water Accounting for the Globalized World Economy:
National Water Footprint And International Virtual Water Trade’, 28 Ecological Indicators 142–149
(2013).
12 John Anthony Allan, ‘Prioritising the Processes beyond the Water Sector that will Secure Water for
Society – Farmers, Fair International Trade and Food Consumption And Waste’, in Luis Martı´nez-
Cortina, Alberto Garrido, and Elena Lo´pez-Gunn (eds), Re-thinking Water and Food Security: Fourth Botı´n
Foundation Water Workshop (London: Taylor & Francis, 2010).
13 Zhan-Ming and Chen, above n 11.
14 Megan Konar et al., ‘Water For Food: The Global Virtual Water Trade Network’, 47 Water Resources
Research W05520 (2011).
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water scarcity.15 While the trade in virtual water can accomplish some of this, it is
also important to note its limitations, as identified below.
International trade in water-intensive products can save water on the global level
by shifting production of water-intensive products to areas where such production is
more efficient because of low rates of evapotranspiration, favorable soil conditions,
other environmental conditions, or technological factors. A study by Hoekstra and
Chapagain estimates that international trade in agricultural products (including crops
and livestock) results in a global saving of 350 billion cubic meters of water per
year.16 The estimate is based on the difference between the water needed to grow
crops in the country where they are grown and the water that would be needed to
grow the same crops in the country where they are consumed, due to differences in
climate and rates of evapotranspiration. This figure has been generally accepted in
the virtual trade research community.17 The overall global water saving from trade
has also been estimated as 6% of agricultural water use.18
In theory, trade in virtual water could also address problems related to the uneven
distribution and use of water resources by facilitating transfer of virtual water from
water-rich to water-poor countries. In practice, evidence for this has been mixed.
Though researchers have found evidence that certain crops are traded from water-
rich to water-poor countries, comprehensive global studies have found no connec-
tion between trade in virtual water and water scarcity.19
In a 2011 study of water use and water availability across the globe, Seekell,
D’Odorico, and Pace found that while there are large differences between countries
in the availability and abundance of water resources, there are relatively small differ-
ences between countries in water use.20 In other words, water-poor countries are cur-
rently using about the same amount of water as water-rich countries, which indicates
that water-rich countries are not fully exploiting their water resources, whereas
water-poor countries are using their resources unsustainably. The researchers found
the least variation in the use of water for internal agricultural production, which was
also the greatest use of water. The amount of water transferred through international
trade was insignificant compared to the amount used for internal agricultural produc-
tion. Existing disparities in distribution of water resources also eclipsed the amount
of virtual water traded. They concluded that the amount of virtual water traded
15 Allan, above n 12; World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2010: Trade in natural resources
(Switzerland: World Trade Organization, 2010); Hoekstra and Chapagain, above n 9.
16 Hoekstra and Chapagain, above n 9.
17 For example, World Trade Organization, above n 15; Alexandre Le Vernoy and Patrick Messerlin, ‘Water
and the WTO: Don’t Kill the Messenger’, Strategic Workshop on: ‘Accounting for Water Scarcity and
Pollution in the Rules of International Trade’ (Amsterdam: Groupe d’Economie Mondiale - Sciences Po,
10 January 2011).
18 Ashok K. Chapagain, Arjen Y. Hoekstra, and Huub H.G. Savenije, ‘Saving Water Through Global Trade’,
Value of Water Research Report Series No. 17 (Deflt: UNESCO-IHE, 2005).
19 Erik Ansink, ‘Refuting Two Claims About Virtual Water Trade’, 69 Ecological Economics 2027–2032
(2010); David A. Seekell, Paolo D’Odorico and Michael L. Pace, ‘Virtual Water Transfers Unlikely to
Redress Inequality in Global Water Use’, 6 Environmental Research Letters 024017 (2011); Arjen Y.
Hoekstra and P.Q. Hung, ‘Virtual Water Trade: A Quantification of Virtual Water Flows between
Nations in relation to International Crop Trade’, Value of Water Research Report Series no. 11 (Delft:
UNESCO-IHE, 2002).
20 Seekell, D’Odorico and Pace, above n 19.
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would have to increase dramatically and realign itself from water-rich to water-poor
countries in order to begin to reduce inequality in distribution of water resources.
Other researchers rate more highly the impact of virtual water trade on a regional
level. Lo´pez-Gunn and Llamas report that while only 4% of global agricultural virtual
water is imported by arid or semi-arid countries, this is still a significant amount of
water. The Middle East and North Africa regions import more virtual water than the
annual average flow of the Nile River.21
Le Vernoy and Messerlin used economic modeling of international trade to show
that water availability is one of several production factors that influence international
trade.22 Even when not motivated by sustainability concerns, countries may decide
to import virtual water as a matter of national policy in order to relieve food and
water security concerns, while not creating dependence on another country.23 Such
trade may also offer a way to defer water conservation measures and charging for
water at home.
C. Virtual water and international trade law
International trade in virtual water raises issues under the WTO, many of which are
familiar in other contexts. This article focuses mainly on trade in agriculture, as the
dominant and best understood form of virtual water transfer. Virtual water transfer
through trade in non-agricultural products, such as cotton apparel and canned food,
will invoke other aspects of the international trade regime.
This preliminary investigation of international trade law applicable to virtual water
trade focuses on tariff reduction, subsidy reform, water efficiency regulations, and
water labeling. The most relevant WTO agreements are the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994 (for non-agricultural products), the Agreement on
Agriculture, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade.24
One of the main issues in the Doha round of trade negotiations is agricultural
reform, which includes improved market access (e.g. through reducing tariffs) and
reductions in trade-distorting subsidies.25 Both tariff reduction and subsidy elimina-
tion could affect trade in virtual water.
One of the central points of this article is that trade liberalization alone will not
optimize virtual water trade to address water-scarcity problems. Putting a price on
water is essential. Otherwise, trade liberalization could contribute to water-scarcity
problems, as discussed below. Other means that focus on managing the demand for
21 Elena Lo´pez-Gunn and M. Ramo´n Llamas, ‘Can Human Ingenuity, Science and Technology Help Solve
the World’s Problems of Water And Food Security?’, in Luis Martı´nez-Cortina, Alberto Garrido, and
Elena Lo´pez-Gunn (eds), Re-thinking Water and Food Security: Fourth Botı´n Foundation Water Workshop
(London: Taylor & Francis, 2010).
22 Le Vernoy and Messerlin, above n 17.
23 John Anthony Allan, ‘Virtual Water — the Water, Food, and Trade Nexus: Useful Concept or
Misleading Metaphor?’, 28 Water International 4–11 (2003).
24 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 15 April 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187 (1994);
Agreement on Agriculture, 15 April 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410; Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), 15 April 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14; Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), 15 April 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 (1994).
25 Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/M/N(01)/Dec/1, Adopted on 20 November 2001.
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water include water efficiency regulations and water labeling, either water intensity
labeling or labeling of water source, as for fossil aquifers. Each of these approaches
may implicate international trade law.
I I . REDUCING AGRICULTURAL TARIFFS
Part of the mandate of the Doha round of trade negotiations is the reduction of tar-
iffs for agricultural products. This has the potential to increase trade in virtual water,
and thereby address water efficiency and distribution issues. However, in practice,
tariff reduction alone may not result in optimization of global water resources
because of water’s small role in production and trade decisions, potential water ineffi-
ciencies arising from comparative advantage, and economic and financial barriers to
participation in international agricultural trade by developing countries. It could,
unintentionally, contribute to water-scarcity problems, so long as water does not
have a price as a commodity.
National- and regional-level studies support the idea that trade liberalization can
increase trade in virtual water. In a study of five countries in Latin America
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru), Niemeyer and Garrido found that trade
liberalization increased trade in agricultural goods.26 If current trade in virtual water
is creating global water savings, increasing trade volume through reducing tariffs and
other barriers to trade may further improve efficiency and, it is argued, address water
scarcity at both the national and global levels.27
There is evidence that liberalizing trade in virtual water, however, may not allevi-
ate water scarcity on the national level. A study of trade liberalization and virtual
water in China found that following accession to the WTO in 2001, China cut tariff
rates on agricultural goods and subsequently imports of grains and soybeans and
exports of vegetables increased.28 However, this did not result in a large net change
in water consumption, because increased vegetable exports required more water for
irrigation, counteracting the water savings from importing grains. This is in line with
other evidence of water-scarce countries exporting water-intensive agricultural
products. The WTO 2010 World Trade Report reports water resource overuse and
depletion in Thailand and Kenya as a result of irrigation of export crops (rice and
flowers, respectively), and a potential problem in Brazil where the government subsi-
dizes fruit exporters through artificially low water pricing.29
On the global level, several economic models have attempted to predict the effect
of reducing tariffs on savings in water globally. A 2008 study by Berrittella et al.
26 Insa Niemeyer and Alberto Garrido, ‘Latin American Agricultural Trade: The Role of the WTO in
Sustainable Virtual Water Flows’, European Association of Agricultural Economists 2011 International
Congress (Zurich: EAAE, 30 August to 2 September 2011).
27 Arjen Y. Hoekstra, ‘The Global Dimension of Water Governance: Nine Reasons for Global
Arrangements in Order to Cope with Local Water Problems’, Value of Water Research Report Series No.
20 (Delft: UNESCO-IHE, 2006); Le Vernoy and Messerlin, above n 17.
28 Yongsong Liao, Charlotte de Fraiture, and Mark Giordano, ‘Global Trade and Water: Lessons from
China and the WTO’, 14 Global Governance 503–521 (2008). The study also pointed out the import-
ance of considering regions within-country: most grains in China are produced in the overexploited
northern region, so import of these products may be particularly important to ensuring water and food
security.
29 World Trade Organization, above n 15; Hoekstra and Chapagain, above n 9.
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modeled water use in representative developed and developing countries under vari-
ous agricultural tariff reduction scenarios of up to 75% tariff reduction. The model
predicted that trade liberalization would enhance current patterns of trade, with coun-
tries that currently substantially export virtual water exporting even more, and coun-
tries that currently substantially import virtual water importing more. However, the
model also predicted that changes in national water use under all scenarios would be
small, not exceeding 10%. Moreover, the authors found no clear relationship between
absolute water scarcity and change in use under the tariff reduction scenarios, though
trade liberalization would incidentally reduce export of virtual water from some of the
world’s most water-scarce regions: the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa.30
An earlier study by Ramirez-Valejo and Rogers, which modeled the impact of
removal of all barriers to trade, including tariffs as well as all agricultural subsidies,
resulted in similar predictions, that trade liberalization would lead to increases in vir-
tual water export from USA and Latin America, and increases in virtual water import
to Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and the former USSR. Like the results of the Berrittella
model, this study found no correlation between virtual water import and local water
scarcity: trade liberalization did not necessarily lead water-poor countries to import
more virtual water.31 Both studies suggest that trade liberalization through reduction
of agricultural tariffs will not adequately address problems of water resource scarcity
and uneven distribution.
There are several reasons why tariff reductions alone might not adequately
improve efficiency in the use of water, the uneven distribution of water resources, or
the problems of water scarcity. Water is not a primary driver of production and trade
decisions, in part because it is either not priced or underpriced, and because it can be
eclipsed by other factors, including political pressure.
Because water is usually underpriced or not priced at all, water scarcity does not
send a strong signal to producers or investors. In a study of Spain, Garrido et al.
found that the volume of virtual water exports did not respond to changes in water
scarcity.32 Other factors, such as the availability of arable land, labor costs, access to
technology, national food policies, and international trade agreements send much
stronger signals.33 Even cultural values can override water considerations in deter-
mining production and trade decisions. Australia and USA export substantial quanti-
ties of irrigated agricultural products at prices equal to or lower than the cost of
production. This is done for political reasons derived from both the lobbying power
of agribusiness and from the input of cultures that place a non-economic value on
maintaining a strong agricultural sector.34
30 Maria Berrittella, Katrin Rehdanz, Richard S.J. Tol, and Jian Zhang, ‘The Impact of Trade Liberalization
on Water Use: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis’, 23 Journal of Economic Integration
631–655 (2008).
31 J. Ramirez-Vallejo and P. Rogers, ‘Virtual Water Flows and Trade Liberalization’, 49 Water Science and
Technology 25–32 (2004).
32 Alberto Garrido et al., ‘Economic Aspects of Virtual Water Trade: Lessons from the Spanish Case’, in
Luis Martı´nez-Cortina, Alberto Garrido, and Elena Lo´pez-Gunn (eds), Re-thinking Water and Food
Security: Fourth Botı´n Foundation Water Workshop (London: Taylor & Francis, 2010) 145.
33 Lo´pez-Gunn and Llamas, above n 21; Ansink, above n 19; Seekell, D’Odorico, and Pace, above n 19.
34 Andrew Biro, ‘Water Wars by Other Means: Virtual Water and Global Economic Restructuring’, 12
Global Environmental Politics 86–103 (2012).
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According to the theory of comparative advantage, countries will export products
that are relatively cheaper or more efficient to produce than other products, even if
their trading partners can produce them even more cheaply. Likewise, countries will
import products for which they have a comparative disadvantage, even if they could
produce those products more cheaply at home. Applied to trade in virtual water,
comparative advantage means that even if water resources are adequately priced,
water-poor countries with a comparative advantage in water-intensive products may
still trade them to water-rich countries with a comparative disadvantage in those
products, and vice versa.35 For example, countries like Afghanistan and Malawi,
which are relatively water-poor but have large amounts of arable land, may have a
comparative advantage in water-intensive goods and therefore will export virtual
water. Similarly, water-rich countries like Norway and Switzerland with a compara-
tive advantage in non-water-intensive goods—because of a lack of arable land and of
well-developed non-agricultural industries—may import virtual water.36 Technology
can also give countries a comparative advantage in water-intensive products, even if
they are water-poor.37 These considerations are critical in global agriculture.
Developing countries may have trouble participating in international virtual water
trade. In a study of the virtual water trade network, Konar et al. found that 80% of
global virtual water in trade flowed along only 4.2% of the links in the global
network.38 This created what they termed a ‘weighted rich club phenomenon’ in
which dominant developed countries participated in large-volume trade, whereas
small countries traded relatively small volumes on the ‘trade periphery’.39
Virtual water transfer only provides a means for redistributing water resources
and ensuring food security if water-poor countries can afford to import water-
intensive resources. However, many water-poor countries are also cash-poor and can-
not afford to import virtual water in sufficient quantities.40 At the same time, devel-
oping countries may be limited in their virtual water exports, as developing country
producers may be unable to compete in international markets. International agribusi-
ness operations and farmers based in developed countries have access to resources
that developing country producers may lack, such as low-cost transportation, more
efficient technology, relationships with global trading corporations, government sub-
sidies, and insurance (government or private) against droughts or other loss.41
Developing country producers may find it impossible to compete with these low-
cost agricultural products. Moreover, facilitating entry of low-cost agricultural prod-
ucts to the domestic market in developing countries may affect local producers,
decreasing their profits so that they are unable to invest in the improvements that
35 Dennis Wichelns, ‘The Policy Relevance of Virtual Water can be Enhanced by Considering Comparative
Advantages’, 66 Agricultural Water Management 49–63 (2004); Le Vernoy and Messerlin, above n 17;
Seekell, D’Odorico and Pace, above n 19.
36 Ansink, above n 19.
37 Garrido et al., above n 32.
38 Konar et al., above n 14.
39 Ibid, at 16.
40 For example, Lo´pez-Gunn and Llamas, above n 21; Seekell, D’Odorico and Pace, above n 19.
41 Allan, above n 12; Munir A. Hanjra and M. Ejaz Qureshi, ‘Global Water Crisis and Future Food Security
in an Age of Climate Change’, 35 Food Policy 365–377 (2010).
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might eventually enable them to compete in the international food market.42 In this
way, reducing tariffs could run counter to improving water use efficiency globally, by
closing off the global market to potentially important participants.
Most importantly, trade liberalization through reducing tariffs has the potential to
contribute to the water-scarcity problems in this century unless it is taken in conjunc-
tion with efforts to remove harmful subsidies for water which encourage inefficient
use and to put a price on water, with appropriate exceptions for implementing a
human right to water. If tariffs are reduced or eliminated on agricultural produce,
market access should indeed improve. This should result in greater agricultural trade
and potentially greater agricultural production. This is turn will increase demand for
water, irrespective of whether water is extracted and used efficiently or whether
water-intensive crops are grown in water-poor countries. This scenario could add to
local or larger scale problems of water scarcity. While such a result is surely not auto-
matic, the scenario does caution that trade liberalization needs to proceed in tandem
with analyses and consideration of the projected problems of water scarcity.
I I I . ELIMINATING TRADE-DISTORTING AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES
Agricultural subsidies have the potential to distort trade in virtual water and thereby
affect global water efficiency and distribution. It is important to recognize that even
apparently non-water-related agricultural subsidies can affect trade in water-intensive
agricultural products by lowering the price of such products on international and
domestic markets, and by encouraging increased production which can contribute to
unsustainable water utilization.
The Doha round of trade negotiations includes reducing trade-distorting agricul-
tural subsidies. Both the Agreement on Agriculture and the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures regulate agricultural subsidies that distort trade, includ-
ing export subsidies and domestic support. The Agreement on Agriculture limits the
aggregate amount of domestic support that each member country can provide that
falls into the category of support deemed to have the greatest impact on trade (the
so-called Amber box). This is subject to certain exemptions, the so-called Green and
Blue boxes. The Agreement on Subsides and Countervailing Measures (SCM) regu-
lates the use of subsidies and countervailing duties, which are applied to imports to
offset injury to domestic industry caused by the subsidized imports.43 Domestic sup-
port subsidies are actionable under the SCM only if they are specific to a particular
enterprise or region and cause adverse effects to the domestic interests of another
Member State.
Much of the discussion about agricultural subsidies and water use centers on irri-
gation subsidies, which are a form of domestic support. Irrigation subsidies may be a
significant driver of inefficient water use leading to water scarcity. They can also dis-
rupt any water-related price signal, making it more difficult for scarcity factors to
42 Garrido et al., above n 32.
43 For analysis of the application of the Agreement on Agriculture and the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures to agricultural products, see Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, ‘Water,
Agriculture, and Subsidies in the International Trading System’, in Edith Brown Weiss, Laurence Boisson
de Chazournes, and Natalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder (eds), Fresh Water and International Economic Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 207–231.
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influence virtual water trade. However, such subsidies may not be subject to controls
under either the Agreement on Agriculture, which exempts ‘water supply facilities,
dams, and drainage systems’, or the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, which exempts ‘general infrastructure’ and which requires injury to a
domestic industry of an importing State. Such market distortion may be difficult to
show in the case of water-related subsidies.44 It may also be difficult to show that
water-related subsidies meet the definition and specificity requirements for action-
able subsidies under the SCM.45
All forms of agricultural subsidies, including subsidies not directly involving irriga-
tion, however, can affect trade in virtual water. Both export subsidies and domestic
production subsidies can lower global prices of agricultural products even below the
cost of production. Developed countries are primary users of such subsidies. For
example, the European Union exports wheat at 50% of its production costs, driving
down global wheat prices, whereas USA sends heavily subsidized maize, wheat, and
soybean onto the global market.46 These artificially low-priced agricultural products
can affect domestic producers in countries that do not employ such strong domestic
agricultural support, particularly developing countries. Notably, this impact on the
domestic agricultural market in other countries would constitute an adverse effect on
the interests of another member, within the meaning of the SCM Agreement.
Agricultural subsidies which affect international trade and foreign domestic markets
in this way, therefore, could be actionable under the SCM Agreement, provided
they go beyond general infrastructure. Moreover, many such trade-distorting agricul-
tural subsidies fall within the Amber box under the Agreement on Agriculture
and are therefore counted as part of a country’s total aggregate measurement of
support.
Elimination of these subsidies would most likely increase the price of water-
intensive agricultural products on the global market. However, it is difficult to judge
the extent of the effect. In a 2004 study, Ramirez-Vallejo and Rogers simulated
removal of all trade barriers and agricultural subsidies, including producer and con-
sumer subsidies. They found that such liberalization would lead to increases in the
prices of cereals and meat products on the global market.47 However, a 2005 FAO
modeling study focusing on irrigated agricultural products showed only a small
(2–4%) increase in the price of internationally traded irrigated agricultural products,
with a correspondingly small (<1%) increase in the annual rate of growth of
developing country agricultural sectors.48 In these models, tariff reductions, which
effectively lower the price of internationally traded agricultural goods, may have
counteracted some of the effects of subsidy reform. It is difficult to judge the extent
44 Ibid. Notably, in its required subsidy notifications under the Agreement on Agriculture, USA has in the
past listed irrigation subsidies, such as for infrastructure, as ‘Amber Box’ subsidies, subject to limits and
scheduled reductions, but it has not included water provided to agriculture producers at below market
rates. Ibid, at 219.
45 Ibid.
46 Gerald A. Cornish and Sara Fernandez, ‘Agricultural Trade Liberalization: Implications for Irrigated
Agriculture’, IPTRID Issue Paper no. 5 (Rome: FAO, 2005).
47 Ramirez-Vallejo and Rogers, above n 31.
48 Cornish and Fernandez, above n 46.
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of the impact subsidy elimination alone would have on international virtual water
trade.
If subsidy reform did increase the international price of water-intensive agricul-
tural products, it could facilitate access to the international market for developing
country producers. Even if, together with tariff reduction, subsidy reform did not
result in a large absolute increase in the international price of agricultural products, it
could still help level the playing field between developing country and developed
country producers. However, subsidy reform could also limit the ability of water-
poor developing countries to import agricultural products.
An additional problem associated with subsidy reform is one of implementations.
Under the SCM Agreement, the primary remedy for trade-distorting subsidies is
imposition of countervailing duties by an importing country that can show harm to
its domestic industry. A country that chose to subsidize in a way that is inconsistent
with the WTO rules could still produce cheap agricultural produce and export it to
countries that do not use countervailing duties, either because they do not produce
the product domestically and therefore are not in competition with the subsidizing
country, or because they are highly in need of the subsidized agricultural produce.49
IV . REGULATING WATER EFFICIENCY
Regulations that promote efficient use of water could be used to help manage
international trade in virtual water. National or subnational water efficiency standards
that apply to both domestically produced and imported products would close off
those markets to products which did not meet such standards, putting pressure
on producers to use more water-efficient technology, or relocate to more water-
efficient locations. Regulations should be developed so as to minimize administrative
costs.
A regulatory system for water efficiency would require methods for accurately and
consistently measuring virtual water content across the life cycle of different prod-
ucts. It would have to set a water efficiency threshold at a high enough level to allow
sufficient production to meet the need, but a low enough level to put some pressure
on producers to be more water efficient. In this, water could be particularly problem-
atic, since all goods require some amount of water, for which in almost all cases there
is no substitute. Finally, implementation of virtual water efficiency regulations would
require fair and continuous monitoring to ensure that products coming from a multi-
tude of countries and situations met water efficiency standards.
A focus on water-efficient technology or practices rather than absolute virtual
water content could make implementation easier. However, such a system would
have no effect on shifting production to water-efficient production regions, as even
producers in inefficient regions could meet the regulatory standards as long as they
used qualifying technology and/or practices. Alternatively, some of the evaluation
and implementation costs of water efficiency regulation could be alleviated through
reliance on self-reporting by producers with some mechanism for third-party
confirmation.
49 Patrick Messerlin, ‘Climate, Trade and Water: A ‘Grand Coalition’?’, 34(11) The World Economy
1883–1910 (2011).
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Water efficiency regulations could also raise problems under the WTO. Both the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT) require WTO Members to ensure that imported products
are accorded ‘treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products’ of
national origin and to like products imported from other countries.50
In determining whether products are ‘like’, the WTO dispute settlement bodies
look to whether they are in a ‘competitive relationship in the marketplace’, relying on
such factors as end use, consumer preference, tariff classification, and physical proper-
ties of the product.51 Typically, such determinations are made on the basis of charac-
teristics inherent in the product as traded—product-related distinctions. However,
regulations based on virtual water content constitute a type of non-product-related
process and production method distinction (npr-PPM). Such distinctions are based on
production characteristics that do not affect the final product. For example, a loaf of
bread produced using 1200 liters of water looks, smells, and tastes no different from a
loaf of bread produced using 500 liters.52 One might conceivably argue, though subject
to much debate, that non-product-related process and production method distinctions
(npr-PPM) such as virtual water content could provide grounds to find that otherwise
identical products are not ‘like’, particularly where they influence consumer prefer-
ence.53 However, in previous cases, such as USTuna II, the Panel and Appellate
Body have treated products differing only in npr-PPM factors as like products.54 If this
trend continues, then regulation on the basis of virtual water content could be judged
discriminatory between ‘like’ products. Where such discrimination disproportionately
affects imported products from certain countries—which, given discrepancies in water
efficiency of agricultural production in different countries, is not unlikely—this might
constitute de facto discrimination against those countries.55
In cases of de facto discrimination under the TBT, the dispute settlement bodies
of the WTO must look to whether the discrimination results ‘exclusively from a legit-
imate regulatory distinction rather than reflecting discrimination against the group of
imported products’ to determine whether it constitutes ‘less favourable treatment’,
which is prohibited under TBT Article 2.1.56 Therefore, even if identical products
50 TBT Agreement, Article 2.1; GATT arts. I.1, III.4.
51 WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities — Measures Affecting Asbestos and Products
Containing Asbestos (EC – Asbestos), WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001; WTO Appellate Body
Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes (US – Clove
Cigarettes), WT/DS406/AB/R, adopted 24 April 2012, para 110.
52 An average 750 kg loaf of bread has a water footprint of 1200 liters; while a loaf of bread baked with
Dutch wheat has a water footprint of 460 liters, considering only water content of the flour used. Data
taken from Water Footprint Network Product Gallery, available at http://www.waterfootprint.org/
?page¼files/productgallery (accessed 16 July 2013).
53 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, above n 51, para 137 (affirming that consumer
preferences should be considered in ‘like–product’ determinations).
54 In this case, tuna caught in Mexican waters by methods involving setting nets around pods of dolphins
was judged ‘like’ tuna caught by ‘dolphin–safe’ methods. WTO Appellate Body Report, United States –
Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US – Tuna II), WT/
DS381/AB/R, adopted 13 June 2012.
55 Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, above n 51 (stating that even facially neutral regulations
can result in de facto discrimination if they disproportionately affect imports from a Member country).
56 Ibid; Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II, above n 54.
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with different virtual water contents are determined to be like products under the
TBT, a regulating country could still be in conformity with its obligations under the
TBT as long as the regulation is based on a legitimate regulatory distinction.
GATT Article III has also been interpreted to cover de facto discrimination, where
formal regulatory equality creates conditions less favourable to imported products.57
However, even if water efficiency regulations were determined to constitute a viola-
tion of this provision, they might still be justified by one of the exceptions listed in
Article XX of GATT. Article XX(b) creates an exception for measures ‘necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health’ and XX(g) creates an exception for
measures ‘relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such meas-
ures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption’. The latter is an easier standard to meet. Even if the measures are
qualified under one of the exceptions, they would then also have to conform to the
requirements of the Article XX chapeau. This requires that they not be applied in a
manner which would constitute ‘a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction
on international trade’. A water efficiency regulation would need to be designed
with these requirements in mind—i.e. it should use the same methods for
evaluating virtual water content for products imported from all countries and for
domestic products, and it should ensure that regulations are applied fairly and
transparently.58
V. INITIATING WATER LABELING
Water labeling would give consumers information about the ‘water footprint’ of a
given good or product. It offers one approach to inducing more efficient use of water
and to limiting unsustainable exploitation of water resources. Water labeling in the
context of the trade in virtual water would potentially make water content a factor in
demand for certain products. Labels give consumers especially valuable information
when they relate to attributes not immediately apparent in the final product.
Consumers can then draw on environmental, social, and other values in making pur-
chasing decisions, and put pressure on producers to conform to these values. Little
has been written about the trade implications of virtual water labels. However, other
forms of environmental labels, such as carbon labels, are increasingly subject to
discourse both within and outside of the WTO, much of which is applicable to vir-
tual water labels as well. The question of environmental labeling is included in the
agenda of the Committee on Trade and the Environment in the WTO Doha
negotiations.59
57 GATT Panel Report, United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, BISD 36S/345, adopted 7
November 1989; WTO Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation
and Internal Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes), WT/DS302/AB/R,
adopted 19 May 2005.
58 See WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products (US – Shrimp), WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998; WTO Appellate Body Report,
United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products - Recourse to Article 21.5 of the
DSU by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW, adopted 21 November 2001.
59 Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/M/N(01)/Dec/1, Adopted on 20 November 2001.
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A. Potential effectiveness of water labeling
In considering water labeling, experience with environmental labels or ecolabels is
relevant. Environmental labels have been effective in enabling consumer pressure to
manage producer behavior. For example, rising public concern about dolphin-killing
in the late 1980s and early 1990s led USA and other countries to create ‘dolphin-safe’
tuna labels, to allow consumers to purchase according to their values, sending a price
signal to producers and ultimately leading to a change in typical sourcing practices
for canned tuna.60 The effectiveness of labels as a means of market manipulation
depends on several factors including nature and reliability of information provided,
availability of alternatives, and consumer awareness of, and concern over, the issue at
stake.
For labels to be effective, the information provided must be understandable, credi-
ble, and accurate. Consumers will not base purchasing decisions on information they
do not deem to be credible. There is also a danger that consumers could make
choices based on incomplete information or labels they do not fully understand,
which could create unwanted market distortion.61 Third-party labeling standards and
regulations can help ensure accuracy, clarity, and credibility of information.
However, labeling standards impose a cost on producers, which can be particularly
problematic for smaller producers and developing country producers.62
Developed country consumers may be more aware of and willing to spend money
to address issues such as water scarcity than their developing country counterparts.63
If so, labeling may contribute to managing virtual water transfers to developed coun-
tries, but not to developing countries. However, given the current primacy of devel-
oped countries in virtual water trade, as discussed above, this will only be a problem
if developing countries are able to increase their virtual water imports.
In theory, labeling could reduce demand for certain products in developed
countries, lowering international prices.64 This could negatively impact developing
country producers, which would struggle to compete on the international market
with both high water efficiency products—because of labeling costs and technology
costs—and low water efficiency products—because of depressed prices from
reduced developed country demand.
There are different possible types of virtual water labels, which will impact the
effect of a labeling scheme as well as its compatibility with international trade law.
These include: (1) virtual water content labels, which list the virtual water content
of the product; (2) virtual water ratings, which award water efficiency ratings to
products depending on their virtual water content relative to optimal virtual water
60 See Mark A. Cohen and Michael P. Vandenbergh, ‘The Potential Role of Carbon Labeling in a Green
Economy’, 34 Energy Economics S53–S63 (2012).
61 Ilona Cheyne, ‘Proportionality, Proximity and Environmental Labelling in WTO Law’, 12 Journal of
International Economic Law 927–952 (2009).
62 Jane Kloeckner, ‘The Power of Eco-Labels: Communicating Climate Change using Carbon Footprint
Labels Consistent with International Trade Regimes under the WTO’, 3 Climate Law 209–230 (2012).
63 See Shane Baddeley, Peter Cheng, and Robert Wolfe, ‘Trade Policy Implications of Carbon Labels on
Food’, 13 The Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy 59–93 (2012) (suggesting
that developed country consumers are more likely to respond to carbon labels because they are more
aware of and concerned about global warming).
64 Cohen and Vandenbergh, above n 60.
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content for that product category; (3) virtual water efficiency threshold labels, which
affirm that the product meets a certain standard of virtual water efficiency; and (4)
virtual water source labels, which identify whether water used in production of a
product comes from a non-renewable fossil aquifer. The last label addresses an issue
specific to fresh water. Since fossil aquifers do not recharge, using the water now
means that it is not available to future generations. If criteria could be developed for
equitable or sustainable exploitation of the aquifer, labels could reflect these.
The different types of labels may have different levels of effectiveness, depending
on the goal. Virtual water content labels may provide a means of raising awareness
about the different water content of different types of products, and encourage shifts
away from water-intensive categories of products, like meats and cheeses. However,
such labels may be less effective at influencing choices within product categories, as
the differences between virtual water content of different products is so great as to
potentially overwhelm differences between brands. For example, 1 kg of beef con-
tains on average 15,400 liters of virtual water, while 1 kg of tomatoes contains 200
liters.65 A rating system or water efficiency threshold system might be more suited to
encouraging comparison within product categories—which could have the most
effect on shifting production of certain products to more water-efficient locations—
but would not allow comparison between types of products. Virtual water source
labels would allow consumers to choose either types of products or specific brands
which use water from renewable sources, regardless of amount of water used.
Like direct virtual water regulation, virtual water labeling systems need to work
out standardized, fair, accurate methods to measure virtual water content across the
life cycle of a product—a potentially difficult and costly task. Rating systems and
water efficiency threshold systems also need to set qualifying levels for the different
ratings and the threshold, respectively. Because of the administrative costs involved,
labeling systems may need to focus on products with the potential to make the most
difference in international virtual water trade. These might include water-intensive
products that have readily available substitutes that are less water-intensive, which
consumers are likely to use, and products that vary greatly in virtual water content
depending on production method or location, which lets consumers choose lower
water intensity products of the same type.66
Virtual water labels can be voluntary or non-voluntary. Mandatory labels impose
costs on all producers who seek to enter a market, which can exclude smaller firms
or developing country producers.67 However, even voluntary labels can have the
effect of disadvantaging developing country producers in environmentally conscious
markets, unless they can implement the labels.
Many well-known and commonly used labeling systems in the world are
promulgated and managed by non-government entities. These include Fairtrade
65 Data taken from Water Footprint Network Product Gallery, available at http://www.waterfootprint.org/
?page¼files/productgallery (accessed 16 July 2013).
66 See Cohen and Vandenbergh, above n 60, for a discussion of the types of products which should be
labeled in the context of carbon labeling. Le Vernoy and Messerlin also argue that a virtual water labeling
system should be limited to a few water-intensive products to avoid excessive administrative costs. Le
Vernoy and Messerlin, above n 17.
67 Baddeley, Cheng, and Wolfe, above n 63.
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International, the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements, and
the Carbon Trust, which operates the Carbon Reduction Label adopted by super-
markets in the UK.68 In the world of environmental labeling, the proliferation of
labeling bodies and the absence of over-arching global coordination have led to mul-
tiple, overlapping, and sometimes conflicting standards which have the potential to
undermine each other’s legitimacy and effectiveness.69 A multitude of standards
could also increase the obstacles to small producers and developing country pro-
ducers which lack capacity to either participate in the development of standards or
meet the multiple overlapping requirements for different markets.
The International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling Alliance
(ISEAL) has stepped forward as an umbrella organization to help coordinate the
practices and processes of these various organizations, and push for official govern-
ment adoption of their labeling standards.70 This organization could provide a frame-
work for developing an international standard for virtual water labeling.
The International Organization of Standardization (ISO), a non-governmental
group composed of national standardizing bodies, could also provide a home for a
global virtual water labeling standard.71 The ISO develops and maintains interna-
tional environmental standards in its ISO 14000 series. ISO 14024 sets out principles
and procedures for environmental labeling systems. It stipulates that labeling criteria
should consider the entire life cycle of the product and should highlight significant
differences that make certain products environmentally preferable to others in the
same product category. Labeling criteria should also be set at attainable levels, devel-
oped through a participatory process, and subject to periodic review and revision.72
Based in part on these criteria, the ISO has developed a specific standard for carbon
footprint labeling.73 Following this model, it could also develop specific standards for
virtual water labeling.
B. Water labeling and international trade law
Both government and private water labeling systems potentially raise questions
under the WTO. The issues depend on the standardizing body, the nature of the
regulation or requirement, and the type of labeling system used.
Government regulations which promulgate or facilitate labeling standards raise
some of the same issues as direct regulations of virtual water content under the TBT
Agreement and the GATT. The type of issue raised depends on the nature of the
labeling regulation, whether it is voluntary or mandatory, and what type of labeling
system it employs.
68 Steven Bernstein and Erin Hannah, ‘Non-State Global Standard Setting and the WTO: Legitimacy and
the Need for Regulatory Space’, 11 Journal of International Economic Law 575–608 (2008).
69 Baddeley, Cheng and Wolfe, above n 63; Bernstein and Hannah, above n 68.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 ISO, Environmental labels and declarations: How ISO standards help (ISO 2012).
73 ISO/TS 14067:2013, Greenhouse Gases – Carbon Footprint of Products – Requirements and Guidelines
for Quantification and Communication, available at http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?
csnumber¼59521 (accessed 7 August 2014).
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Under the TBT Agreement, for a measure to be considered a ‘technical regu-
lation’, compliance must be mandatory.74 However, even ostensibly ‘voluntary’ labels
could be considered ‘mandatory’ if their use is a pre-requisite to entry to a market, or
they preempt equivalent alternatives. For example, in US–Tuna II, the Appellate
Body found that US provisions on ‘dolphin-safe’ labeling for canned tuna were
inconsistent with article 2.1 of the TBT agreement. It found that these labels could
be characterized as technical regulations because, although producers could sell prod-
ucts without the label, they could not use any other label containing terms related to
dolphins, which limited their ability to compete in an environmentally conscious
market.75 Similarly, under the GATT, any law or regulation that affects the condi-
tions of competition, even regulations which provide some measure of private choice,
is subject to the requirement that imported products be treated no less favorably
than domestic like products or products from other countries.76 Given that the pur-
pose of virtual water labeling is to modify the conditions of competition so as to
encourage purchase of less water-intensive products, even ‘voluntary’ labeling
schemes that accomplished this goal might come within the scope of this provision.
Like direct regulations of virtual water content, government labeling regulations
which fall within the scope of the TBT Agreement or GATT must not treat
imported products less favorably than like domestic products or like products
imported from other countries. Labeling schemes that employ a virtual water content
or rating system may not raise issues here at all. Where such schemes apply the same
requirement to all products—that they include on the packaging a rating or virtual
water content—and employ identical and fair evaluation and labeling requirements
across all like products, regardless of country of origin or production method, they
do not discriminate between products, even where similar products with different
virtual water content are considered ‘like’. Threshold-type labels, which would only
be available to products meeting a certain standard of water efficiency, would risk
being considered discriminatory under the TBT and GATT Article III. In US–Tuna
II, the Appellate Body found that ‘dolphin-safe’ labels, only available to products
meeting a certain standard based on fishing methods, resulted in de facto discrimina-
tion against Mexican tuna producers, the majority of which practice a fishing method
which does not meet the standard, because such producers were disadvantaged in
the American market, in which consumers showed a preference for ‘dolphin-safe’
products.77 Similarly, if producers from certain countries were disproportionately
unable to meet water efficiency standards—which is likely given the impact of cli-
mate differences on water efficiency in production—those countries could claim
de facto discrimination under the TBT, and potentially also the GATT. Virtual water
74 TBT Agreement, Annex 1.1.
75 Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II, above n 54.
76 WTO Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Beef (Korea
– Various Measures on Beef), WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001. In this case, the Appellate
Body found that Korean regulations prohibiting imported and domestic beef from being sold in the same
section of a store constituted a violation of GATT Article III.4, because they resulted in many small re-
tailers deciding to stock only domestic beef, reducing imported beef’s access to the market.
77 Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II, above n 54.
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source labels could similarly create situations of de facto discrimination against coun-
tries dependent on fossil aquifers.
As discussed above, a finding of de facto discrimination only indicates a violation
under the TBT if the detrimental impact does not stem from a legitimate regulatory
distinction. In the US–Tuna II case, the Appellate Body found that the de facto dis-
crimination constituted treatment less favourable because USA employed different
labeling requirements for tuna caught within the Eastern Tropical Pacific region
(ETP) as opposed to tuna caught outside that region, and because the distinction
between methods was not ‘calibrated’ to the risks to dolphins from different fishing
methods in different regions.78 The requirement that labeling distinctions be cali-
brated to the regulatory objective should be borne in mind in the design of a virtual
water labeling system, particularly one that employs a virtual water efficiency thresh-
old system.
Though the Appellate Body did not address GATT Article III questions in the
US–Tuna II case, virtual water labeling resulting in de facto discrimination would
likely be treated similarly to other types of regulation, as discussed above. If labeling
systems were found to constitute less favourable treatment, they would still be eligi-
ble for exception under the GATT Article XX(b) and (g) exceptions, as long as they
were not found to be ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ or ‘a disguised restric-
tion on international trade’.
Private virtual water labeling systems would not be directly subject to trade disci-
plines under the GATT or TBT unless officially adopted by a national government.
However, government regulations implementing or facilitating such systems, such as
laws or regulations prohibiting alternative systems or subsidizing producers or
retailers who adhere to such systems, would be subject to claims under the GATT,
TBT Agreement, or, depending on the type of regulation, the SCM Agreement.
Government procurement schemes which favor products meeting privately promul-
gated standards could also fall within the scope of the plurilateral Government
Procurement Agreement when adopted by signatories of that agreement.79 In addi-
tion, countries have obligations relevant to private standards under Article 4.1 of the
TBT Agreement, which mandates that they take reasonable measures to ensure that
non-government standardizing bodies within their territory comply with the Code of
Good Practice included as Annex 3 of the Agreement. This includes requirements
that the standardizing body accord imported products treatment no less favourable
than that accorded to like products of national origin and like products originating in
other countries, and that standards are not applied with a view to creating unneces-
sary obstacles to international trade.
78 Ibid, at para 297.
79 Several governments have adopted policies to consider non-government environmental standards in their
procurement decisions. In 2004, the EC published a handbook advising member countries to consider
international standards, including nongovernment standards, in developing green procurement policies.
European Commission, Buying Green! A Handbook on Environmental Public Procurement (Luxembourg:
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2004). See also Bernstein and Hannah,
above n 68, for a description of non-government environment standards in government procurement
policies.
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The TBT Agreement also requires member countries to use ‘relevant interna-
tional standards’ as a basis for their technical regulations (Article 2.4). Some
researchers have argued that non-government standards could be considered ‘rele-
vant international standards’ under this provision.80 However, in the recent
US–Tuna II case, the Appellate Body restricted the definition of ‘international stand-
ardizing organization’ to one which is open to the standardizing bodies of all WTO
Members.81 Standards adopted by the ISO, which comprises representatives of
national standardization bodies, are more likely to be considered relevant interna-
tional standards under this provision than would other non-governmental standards
without such a broad international character.82
VI . CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ON THE LINKS BETWEEN
VIRTUAL WATER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW,
AND WATER SCARCITY
The international trade in virtual water is, as noted, related in significant part to glo-
bal agricultural trade. The failure to put a price on water distorts trade in agricultural
products and their derivatives and hurts our ability to address the growing issues of
water scarcity. Liberalization of trade laws in the absence of water charges may not
be good for conservation. If trade barriers are removed and even if subsidies are lim-
ited or eliminated, there will still be an incentive to use cheap water. This means that
trade liberalization in the absence of putting a price on water could make the prob-
lems of water scarcity worse globally.
Domestic water pricing is one of the most called-for mechanisms for managing
international trade in virtual water.83 The OECD recommends that countries ensure
that charges for water supplied to agriculture reflect full supply costs, including
opportunity costs and externalities, and cites evidence that raising water charges im-
proves efficiency rather than reducing output.84 The WTO 2010 World Trade
Report calls water pricing the best policy for managing the potential environmental
impact of virtual water trade.85
Putting a price on water raises serious equity issues for poor rural farmers who
survive on subsistence farming, which must be addressed. One possibility would be a
lifeline exclusion for basic needs and certain uses and lower rates for other specific
uses, as is done in some urban settings. Water rates can be differentiated to accom-
modate different equity concerns without sacrificing the beneficial effects of putting
a price on water generally.
Water pricing also raises competitiveness concerns, such as those discussed in
connection with carbon charges. If not all countries establish water -pricing schemes
or different countries significantly under-price water, producers in countries in which
80 Bernstein and Hannah, above n 68.
81 In that case, the AB found that the AIDCP was not an international standardizing organization because it
was not open to the relevant bodies of all Members. Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II, above n 54,
paras 398–99.
82 Kloeckner, above n 62.
83 For example, Garrido et al., above n 32; Le Vernoy and Messerlin, above n 17.
84 OECD, Sustainable Management of Water Resources in Agriculture (Paris: OECD, 2010).
85 World Trade Organization, above n 15.
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water has no price or is under-priced will have an advantage in water-intensive
sectors such as agriculture. This could create a situation of water ‘leakage’, somewhat
analogous to the concern about carbon leakage, where a shift in production to coun-
tries which do not price water counteracts water savings in countries which do price
water. In the absence of a global consensus regarding pricing, concern that pricing
would hurt domestic agricultural production could create powerful political obstacles
to establishing water-pricing measures.
International coordination of national water-pricing systems might be considered.
Some scholars have suggested a water-pricing agreement.86 Such an agreement could
likely be developed to be consistent with WTO rules and principles, but it would be
extremely difficult to negotiate and implement. A more workable alternative might
be an international standard, or even international guidance, on water pricing, to
which countries could voluntarily commit. Such a standard could be sponsored and
hosted by a non-governmental organization, or by an international organization, and
could incorporate pricing guidelines which countries agree to implement once they
commit.
Already there is much attention to a projected global food production problem.
Trade liberalization in agriculture, with accompanying trade in virtual water, could,
as noted, make the water-scarcity problem worse. This, in turn, could give rise to
greater problems in global food production to meet growing international demand
for food. Thus, if we want to address the global food problem, we need to address
the price issue in water, the subsidy issue connected to water, and the ways to reduce
the demand for water, to use it more efficiently, and to inform consumers about the
water used in production. We cannot afford to further trade law without considering
the impacts for the projected water crisis in this century and addressing the link.
Powerful economic and political interests have impeded progress in liberalizing
agricultural trade. These continue in the Doha Round. However, there is now a new
dimension to consider: the impact of trade negotiations on the problems of water
scarcity and on the trade in virtual water. This has implications for the methodolo-
gies used in international trade law. Specialists with knowledge of water resources
and the virtual trade in water should appropriately be included in relevant interna-
tional trade law discussions, and in particular in relevant Doha Round negotiations
related to agriculture and to relevant water subsidies. Conversely, those concerned
with water resources and food policy ought to reflect upon the implications of trade
agreements for conserving such resources and for their equitable distribution.
While this article has focused on international trade law through the WTO, the
methodological implications equally apply to regional and in some cases bilateral
trade negotiations.
86 Le Vernoy and Messerlin, above n 17; Niemeyer and Garrido, above n 26.
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